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Abstract
We study eﬀects of horizontal integration on ﬁrm reputation. In an environment where cus-
tomers observe only imperfect signals about ﬁrms’ eﬀort/quality choices, ﬁrms cannot maintain
good reputation and earn quality premium forever. Even when ﬁrms choose high quality, there
is always a possibility that a bad signal is observed. Thus, ﬁrms must give up their quality
premium, at least temporarily, as punishment. A ﬁrm’s integration decision is based on the
extent to which integration attenuates this necessary cost of maintaining a good reputation.
Horizontal integration leads to a larger market base for the merged ﬁrm, which leads to a more
eﬀective punishment and a better monitoring by eliminating idiosyncratic shocks in many mar-
kets. But it also allows the merged ﬁrm to deviate in a more sophisticated way: the merged
ﬁrm may deviate only in a subset of markets and pretend that a bad outcome in those markets
is observed by accident. This negative eﬀect becomes very severe when the size of the merged
ﬁrm gets larger and there is non-idiosyncratic ﬁrm-speciﬁc noise in the signal. These eﬀects give
rise to a reputation-based theory of the optimal ﬁrm size. We show that the optimal ﬁrm size
is smaller when (1) trades are more frequent and information is disseminated more rapidly; or
(2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium; or (3) customer information
about ﬁrms’ quality choices is more precise.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Reputation has long been considered critical for ﬁrm survival and success in the business world.
Since the seminal work of Kreps (1990), the idea of ﬁrms as bearers of reputation has become
increasingly important in the modern development of the theory of the ﬁrm. For example, Tadelis
(1999, 2002), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and Marvel and Ye (2004) develop models of ﬁrm
reputation as tradable assets and study the market equilibrium for such reputation assets. Klein
and Leﬄer (1981) and Hörner (2002) analyze how competition helps ﬁrms build good reputations
when their behavior is not perfectly monitored by customers. These studies provide very useful
insights into how ﬁrm reputation can be built, maintained and traded. However, for reputation to
be a deﬁning feature in the theory of the ﬁrm, an important question needs to be answered: How
does ﬁrm reputation aﬀect the boundaries of the ﬁrm?1
In this paper we build a simple model to study the eﬀects of horizontal integration on
ﬁrm reputation. We consider an environment where ﬁrms produce experience goods in the sense
that customers cannot observe product quality at the time of purchase, but their consumption
experience provides noisy public information about product quality (e.g., consumer ratings).2
Absent proper incentives, ﬁrms will tend to shirk on quality to save costs, making customers
reluctant to purchase. Using a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring, it is easy to
show that as long as ﬁrms care suﬃciently about the future, they can establish reputations of high
quality and earn quality premium while building customers loyalty.3 However, unlike the case
with perfect monitoring, ﬁrm reputation can be sustained only if the public signal about a ﬁrm’s
choices is above a certain cut-oﬀ point in every period. With positive probability the public signal
will fall below the cut-oﬀ point, in which case ﬁrm reputation will be lost: either customers will
never buy again or the ﬁrm must pay large ﬁnancial penalties to win back previous customers.
We then consider a situation where several ﬁrms, each serving an independent and symmetric
market, merge into one large ﬁrm.4 Horizontal integration leads to a larger market base for the
1The boundary of the ﬁrm question was ﬁrst raised by the classical work of Coase (1937). Several inﬂuential
theories have been proposed to answer the question, for example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1985),
and Hart (1995). Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) oﬀer a review and critique of these theories.
2Professional services, food services, and consumer durable goods are standard examples of experience goods.
3Our analysis is an application of the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring, see, e.g., Green and
Porter (1984), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990), and many others.
4Note that we consider horizontal integration of ﬁrms that produce similar products (the assumption of symmetric
1merged ﬁrm, which allows a more eﬀective punishment and better monitoring by eliminating
all idiosyncratic shocks across the markets. On the other hand, horizontal integration gives the
merged ﬁrm more room for sophisticated deviations; it may deviate only in a subset of markets
and pretend that a bad outcome in those markets was observed by an accident. This negative
eﬀect becomes more severe as the ﬁrm size gets larger when there is non-idiosyncratic ﬁrm-speciﬁc
noise in the perfect public signal. These two eﬀects on reputation building give rise to meaningful
trade-oﬀs for horizontal integration, leading to a reputation-based theory of the optimal ﬁrm size.
We characterize the optimal level of integration and provide a clear comparative statics result
regarding the optimal size of the ﬁrm. We show that the optimal size of the ﬁrm is smaller (or,
non-integration is more likely to dominate integration) when (1) trades are more frequent and
information is disseminated more rapidly; or (2) the deviation gain is relatively smaller compared
to the reputation premium; or (3) customers information about ﬁrms’ choices is more precise. We
also provide suﬃcient conditions under which non-integration is optimal.
The results of our paper shed light on the patterns of horizontal integration observed in the
real world. For example, horizontal integration such as franchising is very common in industries
that mainly provide services to travelers, e.g., hotels and car rentals.5 In these industries, customers
interact with a ﬁrm infrequently and the customer base of a ﬁrm tends to be quite heterogenous,
which corresponds to more discounting (smaller discount factors) and larger communication noises
in our model. As our results show, in such cases independent ﬁrms cannot build reputation
eﬀectively, and horizontal integration can improve on reputation building. Similarly, in industries
providing services to both travelers and locals such as taxicabs and convenience stores, horizontal
integration (either as franchising like the Seven-Eleven stores, or mergers of taxicab companies)
seems to be quite common, though less as common as in purely travel industries.
For another example, chains are more common in the fast food sector than they are among
high end restaurants. Fast food restaurants provide more homogenous products than high end
markets). Our model does not directly apply to ﬁrms with multiple product lines that are obviously of diﬀerent
quality levels, e.g., Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express, or Toyota’s wide range of models, from Tercel to Lexus.
Such cases (brand expansion) are analyzed by Andersson (2002) from reputation concerns.
5Note that we focus on the reputation pooling aspect of franchising in the paper, and ignore the ownership and
incentives issues of franchising that has been analyzed extensively in the existing literature. Two essential features
common in many franchises, trademark (brand names carrying collective reputation) and quality control, correspond
nicely to our model.
2restaurants, thus their proﬁt margins are on average smaller than high end restaurants. Our
results suggest that if payoﬀs from maintaining a good reputation are greater relative to deviation
gains (e.g. high proﬁt margin restaurants), non-integration is more likely to dominate integration.6
While other explanations are certainly possible in these examples, our theory provides a new
perspective and oﬀers a new insight into horizontal integration that potentially can be tested
with real world data. In fact, in a recent empirical paper that analyzes reputation incentives for
restaurant hygiene, Jin and Leslie (2004) ﬁnd evidence consistent with our theory. For example,
they ﬁnd that restaurant chains are more likely to be found in tourist locations. Moreover, “regions
where independent restaurants tend to have relatively good quality hygiene, the incremental eﬀect
on hygiene from chain aﬃliation is lower.”
To understand the basic ideas, consider several independent ﬁrms serving separate markets
and suppose that they merge into one single ﬁrm. The integrated ﬁrm makes eﬀort/quality deci-
sions in the production process and allocates products to all the markets it serves. Customers in
each market observe some noisy signal about the ﬁrm’s product quality in all the markets. We ﬁrst
demonstrate that in the best equilibrium, only the average eﬀort or the average signal matters.
Speciﬁcally, as long as the average signal is above a certain cut-oﬀ point, the ﬁrm provides high
quality goods in all the markets; otherwise either customers in all the markets desert the ﬁrm
forever or the ﬁrm pays large ﬁnancial penalties to the customers in all markets.7 This cut-oﬀ
point determines how long the ﬁrm’s reputation will be sustained, thus the level of the optimal rep-
utation equilibrium payoﬀ. The lower the cutoﬀ p o i n ti s ,t h em o r ee ﬃcient the optimal reputation
equilibrium is. Then the optimal ﬁrm size of a ﬁrm is the size for which the lowest cut-oﬀ point is
obtained so that reputation lasts the longest, thus the expected proﬁt per market is maximized.
In our model, integration has three eﬀects on reputation: a positive size eﬀect, a positive
6The pattern of horizontal integration in the food industry is also consistent with the previous point: compared
to fast food restaurants (especially those along highways or in airports), high end restaurants are more focused on
serving local communities. Thus, less discounting (larger discount factors) and smaller communication noises make
non-integration more attractive for high end restaurants.
7This is consistent with the observation that customers usually care about public signals about a ﬁrm’s aggregate
choices or overall performance such as its product quality ranking and rating of consumer satisfaction. Public signals
about each branch’s choice may not be available or too noisy to be useful. For example, it can prove very diﬃcult
to discern accounting records for each of the ﬁrm’s divisions since there are numerous ways to allocate costs and
revenues within the ﬁrm. But even in cases where public signals of product quality are available in each market, our
result (Lemma 3) suggests that it is suﬃcient to look at the aggregate signal about the ﬁrm’s overall quality.
3information eﬀect, a negative deviation eﬀect. First, a large ﬁrm size helps reputation building by
making more severe punishment possible (e.g., shutting down the whole ﬁrm in every market) for
a ﬁxed magnitude of deviation (e.g., choosing low quality in only one market). The merged ﬁrm
has more to lose, thus has more incentives to maintain reputation for a given cutoﬀ point. This
eﬀect makes it possible to use a lower the cutoﬀ point to make reputation more long lasting.8
The second eﬀect of integration on reputation, the information eﬀect, is that integration may
allow information aggregation across markets and thus make it easier for customers to monitor
a ﬁrm serving a large number of markets. Since an integrated ﬁrm’s reputation is contingent on
the public signal averaged over the markets it serves, its reputation mechanism depends on the
informativeness of the average signal. Since market-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to
be independent, they are washed away by the law of large numbers as the size of the ﬁrm becomes
larger. Thus reputation building becomes relatively easier for large ﬁrms.
T h el a s te ﬀect of integration on reputation is that the merged ﬁrm has more opportunities
for deviation than independent ﬁrms. A ﬁrm that serves n markets can deviate in any m ≤ n
markets, and thus has to satisfy n incentive constraints to maintain its reputation. This, of course,
impedes reputation-building. This constraint is especially strong when the large ﬁrm deviates only
in a tiny fraction of markets because bad outcomes in a few markets are indistinguishable from
noise. Indeed we can show that under mild conditions, the single-market deviation constraint is
the only binding incentive constraint. While market-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks are washed away
as the ﬁrm size increases, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc technological noise do not disappear. Since the size of
noise in the average signal is approximately constant and the size of one-market deviation gets
smaller (at the rate of 1
n)a sn →∞ , it becomes more diﬃcult to prevent the one-market deviation
for a larger ﬁrm.
These three eﬀects of horizontal integration on reputation present meaningful trade-oﬀs
regarding ﬁrm size When the positive size eﬀect and information aggregation eﬀect dominate the
negative deviation eﬀect, then we expect ﬁrms to optimally choose a greater degree of horizontal
8To be more precise, it is not ﬁrm size per se that matters. If an independent ﬁrm expands so that its payoﬀsi n
all contingencies simply scale up, its incentives to build reputation will not be aﬀected at all. When two independent
ﬁrms merge into one, what is important is that the merged ﬁrm makes joint decisions for both branches and its
customers understand this. Hence if it appears that the ﬁrm has cheated somewhere, all its customers everywhere
will punish it by desertion. This idea is ﬁrst shown in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and appears in subsequent
papers such as Matsushima (2001) and Andersson (2002).
4integration. Otherwise, the optimal size of the ﬁrm tends to be smaller, and even non-integration
may be optimal. We show that the optimal size of a ﬁrm is bounded under reasonable conditions.
Typically the negative deviation eﬀect eventually dominates the other two eﬀects as a ﬁrm becomes
larger and larger. As a result, the optimal ﬁrm size can be obtained in our framework. This is in
sharp contrast with the existing literature on reputation building. Although based on the model
of repeated games like our paper, this literature emphasizes only positive aspects of integration as
mentioned below, thus does not provide a theory of the optimal level of integration.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on multimarket contacts, e.g., Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) and Matsushima (2001). Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that in the perfect
monitoring setting, two ﬁrms may ﬁnd it easier to collude if they interact in multiple markets in
which they have uneven competitive positions thani ft h e yi n t e r a c ti nas i n g l em a r k e t .M a t s u s h i m a
(2001) considers the setting of imperfect monitoring and proves that two ﬁrms can approach perfect
collusion when the number of market contacts goes to inﬁnity. In these papers, merger always
dominates independence because each market is completely independent from the other markets.
Thus these models are not suited to analyze the bound of ﬁrm size. Our paper demonstrates that
a bound on the ﬁrm size may naturally arise when there is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc production noise which
has some common component across the markets served by the same ﬁrm.
In terms of motivations, our paper is perhaps most closely related to Andersson (2002),
Gutman and Yekouel (2002) and Fishman (2005), all of which study the eﬀects of integration on
ﬁrm reputation in models with perfect monitoring. In Andersson (2002), a ﬁrm producing multiple
products may increase its total proﬁts (relative to independent ﬁrms producing those products),
because pooling the incentive constraints in the multiple markets may allow the ﬁrm to increase
its prices.9 In Gutman and Yekouel (2002) and Fishman (2005), integration facilitates reputation
formation by increasing the number of consumers each ﬁrm serves, which increases the chance that
new consumers learn about the ﬁrms’ performance from pervious consumers in their settings.10 In
our model, ﬁrm choices are imperfectly monitored, and we consider integration across symmetric
9The applications Andersson (2002) considers are brand extensions or “umbrella branding” whereby a ﬁrm pro-
duces diﬀerent kinds of products under one brand (e.g., Porsche watches). For recent contributions and a summary
of the literature, see Cabral (2000).
10In their models, each consumer can tell J consumers of the next generation about a ﬁrm’s performance, and then
each of them can pass on the information to J consumers of the next next generation, and so on. Thus, monitoring
is not exactly perfect but becomes perfect over time.
5markets.11 In contrast to our model, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt can only increase monotonically in its size in
all the papers mentioned above (e.g. the bigger, the better).12
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Then in
Sections 3 and 4, we characterize the best reputation equilibrium of the game for the ﬁrm under
non-integration and integration, respectively. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the two
cases, in Section 5 we obtain the main results about the optimal ﬁrm size and examine how it is
aﬀected by the parameters of the model. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2 The Model
There are a large number of separate markets, in each of which a long-lived ﬁrm sells its products
to its customers.13 Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. Customers in each market are
identical, and the ﬁrms and their respective markets are symmetric. In each period, the ﬁrm in
each market and its customers play the following stage game. At the beginning of a period, the
ﬁrm, who we assume has price-setting power, sets the price p for the period.14 Then the ﬁrm and
the customers play the following game. The customers decide whether to purchase one unit of the
ﬁrm’s products. If they do not buy from the ﬁrm, both the customers and the ﬁrm get a payoﬀ
of zero. If they decide to buy from the ﬁrm, their payoﬀs depend on the ﬁrm’s product quality.
The ﬁrm decides whether to exert high eﬀort eh (or, provide high quality) or exert low eﬀort el
(or, provide low quality), where eh and el are both real numbers and eh >e l.T h e ﬁrm incurs
an eﬀort/quality cost of ch (cl) for providing high (low) quality, where ch >c l. The customers’
expected beneﬁti svh if the ﬁrm chooses eh and is vl if the ﬁrm chooses el,w h e r evh >v l.G i v e np,
the stage game is depicted below in the normal form. Equivalently one can think of an extensive
11In both Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Andersson (2002), ﬁrm size will have no eﬀect if all markets are
symmetric. Unlike Gutman and Yekouel (2002) and Fishman (2005), the ratio of consumers to ﬁr m sd o e sn o tp l a y
al e a r n i n gr o l ei no u rm o d e l .
12Fishman and Rob (2002) study a model of investment in reputation in which ﬁrms’ product qualities are perfectly
observed by some customers, and show that bigger and older ﬁrms have better reputations. Rob and Sekiguchi (2004)
analyze reputation formation under imperfect monitoring in a repeated duopoly setting.
13It is not diﬃcult to introduce competition across the market s . W ec h o s en o tt od os oj u s tb e c a u s ew el i k et o
focus on the reputation-building eﬀect of integrations rather than the typical anti-competitive eﬀect of integrations.
14Our analysis and the main results of the paper will not be aﬀected signiﬁcantly if the ﬁrm does not have full
price-setting power.
6form game in which the customers move ﬁrst with their purchase decisions.
Firm
Low High
Customers Don0tB u y 0 , 0 0 , 0
Buy vl − p , p − cl vh − p , p − ch
We assume vh − ch > 0 >v l − cl:h i g h e ﬀort/quality is more eﬃcient than no trade,
w h i c hi nt u r ni sm o r ee ﬃcient than low eﬀort/quality. Since ch >c l, el (weakly) dominates eh
for the ﬁrm. Hence, for any price p>v l, the unique equilibrium outcome is (Don0tB u y ,L o w ),
resulting in payoﬀs (0,0). The outcome (Buy,High) is the ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃcient in terms of total
surplus and Pareto-dominates (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) for p ∈ (ch,v h).H o w e v e r ,t h i se ﬃcient outcome
is not attainable without reputation eﬀects. Our stage game is in the spirit of Kreps (1990), who
highlights the ﬁrm’s incentive problem in a one-sided Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
We suppose that in each market there are a large number of identical customers that are
anonymous to the ﬁrm in the market. Since an individual customer’s behavior is not observable
by the ﬁrm, customers will maximize their current period payoﬀs. Alternatively, we can assume
customers purchase the products only once (i.e., short-lived customers), in which case they also
maximize current period payoﬀs.15
If the ﬁrm’s eﬀort in each period were publicly observable, it would be straightforward
to show that the eﬃcient outcome (Buy, High) can be supported when future is suﬃciently
important to the ﬁrm. Let δ be the ﬁrm’s discount factor. It can be easily checked that for any price
p ∈ (ch,v h],t h eﬁrst best outcome is attainable in every period if and only if δ ≥ (ch−cl)/(p−cl).
To maximize its proﬁt, the ﬁrm will set price p = vh.
In many cases, however, the ﬁrm’s eﬀort cannot be perfectly observable, especially for experi-
ence goods. For example, given the ﬁrm’s eﬀort, there are unavoidable uncertainties (e.g., machine
malfunctioning, human errors) in production processes that introduce random shocks into product
qualities. When customers purchase the products just once (i.e., short-lived), experiences of the
current period customers may be communicated to future customers with substantial noise (e.g.,
consumer on-line ranking/comments). In such cases, the ﬁrm’s past eﬀort/quality choices can only
be imperfectly observed by the customers in the future.
15Our assumption that customers maximize current period payoﬀs implies that the folk theorem result of Fuden-
berg, Levine and Maskin (1994) does not apply.
7Given these observations, we consider an environment in which a ﬁrm’s eﬀort is not public
information, but rather its noisy public signal y ∈ < becomes available at the end of each period in
each market. Suppose that this ﬁrm is serving market j. Given the ﬁrm’s technology, its product
quality in market j is given by qj = ej+η,w h e r eη ∼ N(0,σ2
η) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc production noise and
is independent across periods. Since ﬁrms’ technology choices are made independently, production
noise η is assumed to be independent across markets as well. In addition to the production noise,
the public signal also contains a market-speciﬁc demand noise component θj ∼ N(0,σ2
θ),w h i c h
is independent across markets and across periods, and independent from production noise. Thus,
the public signal in market j is yj = ej +η+θj = ej +²j,w h e r e²j ∼ N(0,σ2 = σ2
η+σ2
θ) represents
the total noise. This information structure is quite natural, and is commonly used in the existing
literature.
We should note, however, that many of our results can be extended to a more general
information structure, where the signal is drawn from a distribution function F(y|e) with a positive
density function f(y|e) that satisﬁes the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in the sense
of Milgrom (1981). An earlier version of this paper, Cai and Obara (2004), uses this general
formulation. When presenting our results, we shall point out whether they can be extended to
more general information structure.
Following Green and Porter (1984) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), we focus on
(pure strategy) perfect public equilibria of the game. In a perfect public equilibrium, players’
strategies depend only on the past realizations of the public signals. For periods t =2 ,3,...,t h e
public history ht is the sequence of signal realizations and prices in period t − 1 and before. The
customers will base their period t decisions on (ht,p t).T h e ﬁrm’s pricing decision in period t
depends on ht and its eﬀort/quality decision in period t on (ht,p t). In equilibrium, given its full
price setting power, the ﬁrm will always set its price equal to either the customers’ expected beneﬁt
from consuming its products or its production cost, whichever is larger.
We will characterize the perfect public equilibria of the game that yield the greatest average
payoﬀ for the ﬁrm, ﬁrst for the non-integration case in which ﬁrms are independent, and then for
the integration case, in which ﬁrms merge into one big ﬁrm which serves multiple markets. Since
ﬁrms make decisions about integration or disintegration to maximize their value, by comparing
the best equilibrium outcomes in the non-integration and integration cases, we derive conditions
under which integration is better than non-integration or vice versa. We simply call a perfect
public equilibrium that yields the greatest average payoﬀ for the ﬁrm a “best equilibrium”.
83 Best Equilibrium for the Non-Integration Case
We start with the non-integration case. In the non-integration case, ﬁrms are independent decision
makers, so the public signal in one market will not aﬀect the other markets at all, even if it is
observable to the participants in the other markets. Since ﬁrms and markets are symmetric, we
focus on a representative ﬁrm and its market (thus dropping subscript j).
As is typical in repeated games, there can be many perfect public equilibria in our game,
many of which can involve complicated path-dependent strategies. However, it turns out that
the best equilibria in our game have a very simple structure. Deﬁne a cut-oﬀ trigger strategy
equilibrium as follows: the ﬁrm and its customers play (Buy, High) in the ﬁrst period and continue
to choose (Buy, High) as long as y stays above some threshold e y, and play the stage game Nash
equilibrium (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) forever once y falls below the threshold e y. The following lemma,
shows that the best equilibrium must be a cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibrium whenever it is a
nontrivial one.16 This result holds for any general distribution F(y|e) satisfying the Monotone
Likelihood Ratio Property.
Lemma 1 The best equilibrium for the ﬁrm is either a cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibrium with
p = vh in every period, or the repetition of the stage game Nash equilibrium (Don0tB u y ,L o w ).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that in our game, the ﬁrm’s pricing decision can be treated separately from its quality
decision and customers’ purchase decision. Since customers maximize their current period payoﬀs,
they will purchase if and only if the price is not greater than their expected valuation (i.e., vh or
vl, depending on their expectation of the ﬁrm’s quality choice). Thus, in a best equilibrium for
the ﬁrm, it can charge a price that equals to the customers’ expected beneﬁts. When the ﬁrm’s
reputation is good and is expected to provide high eﬀort in the current period, it sets price p = vh.
If the ﬁrm loses its reputation and is expected to choose low eﬀort, the highest price acceptable
to customers is vl, which is not suﬃcient to cover cl by our assumption. Therefore, whenever
customers expect the ﬁrm to choose low eﬀort, the equilibrium outcome is no trade and price is
trivially indeterminate. Since the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing decision is straightforward, we focus our
analysis on its quality decisions and reputation building.
16This is similar to Theorem 7 of Abreu, Pearce, Stacchetti (1990), which proves the necessity of bang-bang
continuation payoﬀs for optimal equilibria.
9Let us ﬁx some terminology and notation. We will sometimes call a stationary cut-oﬀ trigger
strategy equilibrium “reputation equilibrium”. The periods in which the ﬁrm’s reputation is good
and can thus earn quality premium are called the “reputation phase”; otherwise they are called
the “punishment phase”. Let π be the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt averaged over all periods in a best
equilibrium. Deﬁne r = p − ch (= vh − ch) to be the ﬁrm’s current period payoﬀ if it exerts high
eﬀort (“honesty payoﬀ”), and d = ch − cl to be the cost diﬀerential of high and low eﬀorts. If
the ﬁrm chooses low eﬀort, its current period payoﬀ is p − cl = r + d,s od is the ﬁrm’s gain from
deviation.
Let ˜ y be the cut-oﬀ signal used in the equilibrium. Since the public signal is given by






,w h e r eΦ is the standard normal distribution function. Then the ﬁrm’s
average payoﬀ in the equilibrium, π, must satisfy the following value recursive equation:








Equation (1) says that the ﬁrm’s per period value in the equilibrium is the sum of its current
period proﬁt averaged out over time, (1−δ)r, plus the expected average value from continuation,
δ(1 − F (˜ y|eh))π.17
For the ﬁrm to be willing to choose eh, the incentive compatibility constraint requires








The right hand side of Equation (2) if the ﬁrm’s average payoﬀ from choosing el, which consists
of the current period proﬁt averaged out over time, (1−δ)(r+d), plus the expected average value
from continuation, δ(1 − F (˜ y|el))π.
Any pair of (π, ˜ y) that satisﬁes both Equations (1) and (2) gives rise to an equilibrium in
which the ﬁrm will choose high eﬀort every period and customers continue to purchase as long as
y ≥ ˜ y.
Lemma 2 The IC constraint of Equation (2) must be binding in the best reputation equilibrium.
17Following the convention of the repeated game literature, we measure a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ as its expected proﬁt
averaged over the inﬁnite horizon, instead of its total discounted expected payoﬀ.T h e s et w om e a s u r e sd i ﬀer by a
factor of 1 − δ, but the former slightly simpliﬁes notation.
10Proof: Consider any cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibrium with (π, ˜ y) such that Equation (2) holds
as a strict inequality. Then we can decrease ˜ y without aﬀecting the IC constraint. However, as
is clear from Equation (1), this reduces the value of F (˜ y|eh), thus increases π. Contradiction.
Q.E.D.
B yL e m m a2 ,w ec a ns o l v ef o rt h ec u t - o ﬀ point ˜ y and the ﬁrm’s average proﬁt π in the best
reputation equilibrium (if it exists) from Equation (1) and Equation (2) as an equality. After some
manipulation of terms we obtain













This equation simply says that the current period gain from deviation averaged out over time (the
LHS) equals the expected loss of future proﬁt from deviation (the RHS).
It is convenient to focus on the normalized signal k =
y−eh
σ instead of the signal y. Abusing
notation slightly, we shall call k the public signal. Let τ = d/r be the ratio of the deviation gain
to the honesty payoﬀ,a n d4 = eh − el be the eﬀort diﬀerential. Using Equation (1) to eliminate










If there is a solution ˜ k to the fundamental equation (4), then from Equation (1),
π =
(1 − δ)r
1 − δ[1 − Φ(˜ k)]
(5)
Clearly π is a decreasing function of ˜ k. Hence the smallest solution to Equation (4) constitutes
the cut-oﬀ (normalized) signal in the best reputation equilibrium. Thus we have
Proposition 1 There exists a reputation equilibrium if and only if the fundamental equation (4)
has a solution. If that is the case, then the smallest solution is the cut-oﬀ point in the best
equilibrium. The ﬁrm’s value in the best equilibrium is given by (5).
It can be easily veriﬁed that Proposition 1 holds under any signal structure with a general
distribution F(y|e) replacing Φ in Equations (4) and (5).18 By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, the
18Lemma 2 is completely general. The uniqueness of the best cutoﬀ point follows from the MLRP of F (y|e).
11existence of reputation equilibria hinges on whether Equation (4) has a solution. It is called the
fundamental equation because its smallest solution determines the best cut-oﬀ point, which in turn
determines the best equilibrium payoﬀ for the ﬁrm through Equation (5). The characterization of
the ﬁrm’s average expected proﬁt in Proposition 1 resembles that of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce
(1991), who study symmetric perfect public equilibria in repeated partnership games. It can be
veriﬁed that Equation (5) is equivalent to




σ )/Φ(˜ k) − 1
As in their model, here the ﬁrm’s value equals its honesty payoﬀ r minus an incentive cost (the
second term of the RHS) that depends on the deviation gain d and the likelihood ration Φ(˜ k +
4
σ )/Φ(˜ k), which measures how easily the public signal can reveal deviations.







Let δ∗ be the discount factor that satisﬁes 1−δ∗
δ∗ = G(k∗). In the Appendix, we show that the
function G(k) has the shape as shown in Figure 1.
Clearly Equation (4) has either no solution or two solutions, depending on whether δ is above
or below δ∗.19 When there are two solutions, the smaller solution ˜ k is the cut-oﬀ point in the best
equilibrium. Thus we have the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists a reputation equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ∗.W h e n δ > δ∗, the
cut-oﬀ point ˜ k for the best equilibrium is decreasing in δ and 4, and increasing in τ and σ;t h e
ﬁrm’s average payoﬀ is increasing in r, δ and 4, and decreasing in d and σ.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that as long as the ﬁrm cares suﬃciently about the future, reputation can
be built in equilibrium in our model of imperfect monitoring. However, compared with the case of
perfect monitoring (observable eﬀort choices), reputation works less well. Reputation can break
down with a positive probability (indeed almost surely in the long run) even on the equilibrium










Figure 1: Graphic Illustration of the Fundamental Equation
path as in Green and Porter (1984). This is necessary to give the ﬁrm an incentive to stick to
good behavior. In the case of perfect monitoring, no actual punishment is incurred in motivating
the ﬁrm to choose high eﬀort, since any deviation is perfectly detected.
Proposition 2 also establishes the comparative statics for the best equilibrium, which are all
intuitive. It says that reputation will more likely be sustained if (i) the ﬁrm cares more about the
future (greater δ); (ii) the public signal is more revealing about the ﬁrm’s eﬀort choice (greater
4); (iii) the gain from deviation in relative terms is smaller (smaller τ), or (iv) the public signal is
less noisy (smaller σ). Note that in Equation (5), a smaller cut-oﬀ point leads to a higher average
payoﬀ (with r kept constant). All comparative statics follow from this simple observation. Except
for the comparative statics about σ, the rest of Proposition 2 can be extended to the general
distribution F(y|e) under a technical assumption. 20
So far we have assumed that the stage Nash equilibrium (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) is played forever
20Speciﬁcally, the assumption is limy→−∞ f(y|el)/f(y|eh) > 1+τ. This assumption means that small y is
suﬃciently informative about a deviation to low eﬀort. If this inequality is not satisﬁed, then G becomes a negative,
always decreasing function, thus the fundamental equation has no solution so the only equilibrium of the game is
the repetition of the stage Nash equilibrium (Don
0tB u y ,L o w ). This condition is easily satisﬁed by the normal
distribution with ei b e i n gt h em e a n ,a st h el i k e l i h o o dr a t i og o e st oi n ﬁnity as y →− ∞ .
13in the punishment stage. However, both the ﬁrm and its customers have strong incentives to
renegotiate and continue with their relationship when the signal falls below the cut-oﬀ point
(especially considering that the ﬁrm did not do anything wrong on the equilibrium path). In other
words, the above equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof. In Appendix B, we show that the ﬁrm’s
minmax payoﬀ of 0 may be implemented in another equilibrium that is renegotiation-proof, in
which the ﬁrm oﬀers a large discount to the customers by drastically cutting its price when the
signal is below the cut-oﬀ point. Thus, the same equilibrium outcome derived in this section can
be supported in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
4 Best Equilibrium for the Integration Case
Now we analyze the integration case in which n ﬁrms merge into one big ﬁrm. We assume that
the integrated ﬁrm adopts a common technology for all n markets (branches). Since the ﬁrm
adopts a common technology, all its branches share the same production noise η.21 This seems
consistent with the observation that integrated ﬁrms often have centralized quality controls and
try to maintain quality standards across markets and divisions. For example, franchised ﬁrms
and chains typically have centralized supply systems and closely monitor branches and stores for
quality controls.22
Once the big ﬁrm has chosen its technology, the big ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses a price vector (p1,p 2,...,p n)
a n dt h e na ne ﬀort vector of (e1,e 2,...,e n) in the beginning of each period. The public signal in
market jis given by yj = ej + η + θj, where the common production noise η follows N(0,σ2
η) and
the idiosyncratic market demand noise θj follows N(0,σ2
θ). Hence yj can be interpreted as a noisy
signal of quality qj = ej + η in jth market. Let ²j = η + θj be the total noise in market j.,w h i c h
is a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance σ2
η + σ2
θ.
A crucial assumption we make is that all the customers of the integrated ﬁrm use a monitoring
strategy based on the average signal yn =¯ en +¯ ²n,w h e r e¯ en =
Pn
1 ej/n and ¯ ²n is the average
21What we really need here is that technology shocks across the markets served by one big ﬁrm have some common
components. In particular, our analysis extends to the case in which the production noise has some idiosyncratic
shocks across markets; ηj = η0 + ξj,w h e r eξj are i.i.d. mean-zero random variables.
22An industry expert, Mark Siebert, writes that “Top franchisors know that brand maintenance means more than
just marketing. It also means quality control. The best franchisors typically have ﬁeld support personnel whose
responsibility is to visit franchisees in the ﬁeld and determine if they’re living up to brand standards. ....... Beyond
ﬁeld support, the best franchisors are huge advocates of training. ” (http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/)
14noise. Given this assumption, it is straightforward to extend Proposition 1 to the integration case,
that is, we can focus on equilibria in which customers continue to buy if and only if the average
signal is above some cutoﬀ point e yn.
Why customers may use only the average signal
There are two justiﬁcations for this assumption. First, customers of an integrated ﬁrm
often pay attention to aggregated information about the ﬁrm’s overall performance (instead of
disaggregated information about its performance measure in each market or division), such as
its product quality ranking and rating of consumer satisfaction. Because of reasons related to
coordination, information and inﬂuence activities, it is usually diﬃcult to isolate divisions or
branches from interventions of the headquarters or inﬂuences of other divisions.23 Moreover, if
customers infer the ﬁrm’s choices from its accounting books, it can prove very diﬃcult to discern
accounting records for each of the ﬁrm’s divisions since there are numerous ways to allocate costs
and revenues within the ﬁrm.
The second justiﬁcation, which is related to the ﬁrst one, is a theoretical one. It is in fact
without loss of generality to use the average signal if the integrated ﬁrm can allocate resources
and products across markets and divisions freely without being observed by its customers, e.g.,
hiring quality control personnel and sending them to individual branches or shipping products from
centralized warehouses or production facilities to diﬀerent markets. Then, even though customers
may observe signals from all individual markets, they do not know what is really behind the signal
of each market. More formally, suppose that, after (q1,q 2,...,q n) is realized, the integrated ﬁrm can
choose any proﬁle of qualities (q0
1,q0
2,...,q0






satisﬁed. Final signals of individual markets are given by yj = q0
j +θj. In this case, it is intuitively
clear that only the sum of qualities or the average quality (hence the average signal) is informative
about the big ﬁrm’s eﬀort choices.
An informal proof goes as follows. To simplify the argument, suppose that there are only
two markets and the space of signals is <2. The optimal equilibrium must be associated with a
subset of signals Ω ⊂ <2 such that Nash reversion (in every market) occurs with probability 1 if
a n do n l yi f(y1,y 2) ∈ Ω (otherwise (Buy, High) will continue to be played and p = vh is set in
23Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p568-576) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of horizontal integration from
non-reputation perspectives, and present some interesting case studies such as “IBM and EDS” (page 576) that
illustrate the diﬃculties of maintaining independence for divisions in multidivisional ﬁrms.
15all the markets), i.e., the optimal equilibrium must have a bang-bang structure. This is because
concentrating the harshest punishments (e.g. starting Nash reversion) in the most informative
region of signals is more eﬃcient than using weak punishments in less informative regions (cf.
Lemma 1). First note that Ω must be symmetric with respect to the y1 = y2 line. To see this, let
Ω0 be the mirror image of Ω with respect to y1 = y2, i.e. (y0
1,y0
2) ∈ Ω if and only if (y0
2,y0
1) ∈ Ω0.
Then we can construct an equilibrium which uses Ω and Ω0 as the punishment region with equal
probability and generates the same payoﬀ for the ﬁrm. This means that Nash reversion starts with
probability 1
2 when (y1,y 2) ∈ Ω or (y1,y 2) ∈ Ω0. If Ω 6= Ω0, then this means that there exists an
optimal equilibrium where Nash reversion occurs with probability less than 1 for some realization
of signals. This contradicts the bang-bang property of the optimal equilibrium. Hence Ω and
Ω0 must coincide, that is, Ω must be symmetric. Next, notice that the the optimal equilibrium
remains to be an equilibrium even if the punishment region Ω is replaced by any translate of it
to the direction of (1,−1) such as Ω + λ(1,−1) =
©
z ∈ <2|y + λ(1,−1),y∈ Ω,λ ∈ <
ª
. This is
because these punishment regions are eﬀectively identical to the ﬁrm that can reallocate its qualities
(q1,q 2) freely in the direction of (1,−1). Since all these equilibria must be optimal, Ω + λ(1,−1)
must be symmetric for all λ ∈ < by the same reason as before. For Ω to satisfy this requirement,
Ω must look like Ω =
©
(y1,y 2) ∈ <2|y1 + y2 ∈ K
ª
for some subset K of the real line. Therefore
continuation payoﬀs must depend only on the aggregate signal when characterizing the optimal
equilibrium. In this way, we can reduce the dimension of the signals. Note that we do not need
the assumption of normal distributions for this proof. We summarize this discussion below as a
lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the ﬁrm and the customers repeat the above modiﬁed stage game aug-
mented with an additional stage in which the ﬁrm can reallocate qualities across markets ex post.
Then continuation payoﬀs must be measurable with respect to the aggregate signal for any optimal
equilibrium.
Given this Lemma, the following analogue of Lemma 1 can be immediately obtained, where
the cut-oﬀ point for each individual signal is replaced by the cut-oﬀ point for the average signal
and the consumers from every market behave in a symmetric way.
Proposition 3 The best equilibrium for the ﬁrm is either the repetition of the stage game Nash
equilibrium in every market or a cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibrium in which the following prop-
16erties hold in every market:24
(i) In the reputation phase, (Buy, High) is chosen and p is set to vh in every market.
(ii) The play starts in the reputation phase and stay there as long as the average signal yn has
b e e nn ol e s st h a nac u t o ﬀ point e yn. Otherwise, the play switches to the punishment phase.
(iii) In the punishment phase, (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) is played forever in all the markets.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the most eﬀective way to maintain reputation is to use the harshest
possible punishment when punishment is called for, which is to punish the ﬁrm simultaneously in
all markets. Moreover, it needs to depend only on the average/aggregate signal. Proposition 3 also
says that in a best equilibrium, the integrated ﬁrm should choose high eﬀorts in all n markets in
the reputation phase. The idea is that if in an equilibrium customers anticipate that the ﬁrm does
not choose high eﬀorts in all n markets, they are not willing to pay as high as vh.S i n c et h eﬁrm’s
proﬁt margin is lower, it has smaller incentives to maintain reputation, thus requiring a higher
cut-oﬀ point. Since the honesty payoﬀ is lower and the probability of reputation termination is
higher, the ﬁrm’s value per market is lower when it does not choose high eﬀorts in all markets
than when it does.
In the following, we focus on such cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibria.
Characterization
We now characterize the best reputation equilibrium in which the integrated ﬁrm chooses
high eﬀorts in all n markets. For j =0 ,1,...,n,d e n o t eFnj = Fn(yn|¯ e = eh−
j
n4) as the distribution
function of yn when the big ﬁrm chooses low eﬀorts in j of n markets. Its average payoﬀ per period
in the best reputation equilibrium is given by the following value recursive equation:
Π =( 1− δ)nr + δ(1 − Fn(˜ yn|eh))Π (6)
where ˜ yn is the cut-oﬀ point in the best equilibrium.
For the integrated ﬁrm serving n markets, it has n possible deviations by providing low
eﬀorts in m =1 ,2,...,nof the n markets. The IC constraint associated with the mth deviation is
24The non-integration case (Lemma 1) is a special case (n =1 ) .




To facilitate comparisons, deﬁne πn = Π/n as the ﬁrm’s value per market. Then Equations
(6) and (7) can be rewritten as
πn =( 1− δ)r + δ(1 − Fn(˜ yn|eh))πn (8)
πn ≥ (1 − δ)(r +
m
n




Any pair of (πn, ˜ yn) that satisﬁes Equation (8) and all the IC constraints of Equation (9)
gives rise to a reputation equilibrium in which the big ﬁrm chooses high eﬀorts in all markets
and customers buy its products as long as the average signal yn is above ˜ yn. As before, the best
equilibria feature the smallest cut-oﬀ point ˜ yn that satisﬁes Equation (8) and all the IC constraints
of Equation (9). Similar to Lemma 2, it can be shown that one of the IC constraints must be
binding at the smallest cut-oﬀ point. To solve for the smallest cut-oﬀ point ˜ yn,w eﬁrst need to
determine which IC constraint is binding.
Suppose the mth IC constraint is binding in the best equilibrium. Parallel to Proposition 1















The eﬀects of horizontal integration on reputation-building can be clearly seen from Equation
(10). Observe that the denominator of the ﬁrst expression on the LHS is the ratio of the gain
from m deviations to the total honesty payoﬀ in n markets. For any ﬁxed m,al a r g e rn means
that the punishment for deviations is greater, thus increasing the LHS of Equation (10). This size
eﬀect of horizontal integration helps reputation-building by lowering the equilibrium cut-oﬀ point





− Fn (y|eh),t h en u m e r a t o ro ft h eﬁrst
expression on the LHS of Equation (10), because deviations in a ﬁxed number of markets are more
diﬃcult to detect with a larger n. This will tend to increase the equilibrium cut-oﬀ point ˜ yn,t h u s
making reputation-building less eﬀective. Moreover, a larger n also means that the merged ﬁrm
has more sophisticated deviations to contemplate, that is, the number of IC constraints grows with
n.
18Let’s call Equation (9) the 1−market deviation constraint when m =1 .25 With our infor-
mation structure yn =¯ en +¯ ²n,w h e r e¯ ²n follows N(0, ¯ σ2
n),w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 4 Suppose 0.542/σ2
η ≤ ln(1+τ). For any n,o n l yt h e1-market deviation constraint
is binding in the best equilibrium for the ﬁrm.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 gives a suﬃcient condition under which the 1-market deviation IC constraint is
t h em o s td i ﬃcult to satisfy and hence must be binding in the best equilibrium. Roughly speaking,
the condition requires that the production noise is signiﬁcant. In such cases, smaller deviations
are much more diﬃcult to detect than larger deviations, thus making the 1-market deviation the
most demanding to satisfy.
The condition in Proposition 4 is far from necessary. In particular, normality is not required.




d ≤ δ(Fn(˜ yn|eh −
m
n
4) − Fn(˜ yn|eh))πn
Note that Equation (9) with m =1implies all the other constraints for m>1 as long as Fn(˜ yn|eh−
m
n 4) − Fn(˜ yn|eh)) increases faster than linearly in m. This is satisﬁed when the density function
fn is increasing around ˜ yn.26 This is usually satisﬁed at the lower tail of distribution, which is
the relevant domain when δ is large. In the rest of the paper, we assume that only the 1-market
deviation is binding in the best equilibrium for any n. Then the optimal cut-oﬀ point in the best





























25Note that since the ﬁrm allocates products across markets evenly, product quality in every market becomes
lower if the ﬁrm deviates to low eﬀort in one of the n markets.
26Convexity of Fn(˜ yn|eh − x4) in x ∈ [0,1] at ˜ yn is suﬃcient for our purpose. Since yn =¯ en +¯ ²n, this condition
is equivalent to Fn(˜ yn + x4|eh) being convex in x ∈ [0,1], which in turn is equivalent to fn(˜ yn + x4|eh) increasing
in x ∈ [0,1].
19where k =
y−eh
¯ σn . Note that when n =1 , ¯ σ1 = σ, and Equation (12) becomes Equation (4).
Let ˜ kn(δ,τ,4, ¯ σn) be the smaller of the two solutions to Equation (12). It is easy to see that
˜ kn(δ,τ,4, ¯ σn) has all the properties of ˜ k(δ,τ,4,σ), the smaller of the two solutions to Equation
(4). That is, ˜ kn(δ,τ,4, ¯ σn) is increasing in τ and ¯ σn, and decreasing in δ and 4.
With this transformation of variables, the probability of reputation termination in the best
equilibrium, Fn(˜ yn|eh),i ss i m p l yΦ(˜ kn). In summary, the best equilibrium for the ﬁrm serving n
markets can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 5 There exists a reputation equilibrium for the ﬁrm serving n m a r k e t sa sl o n ga s
δ ≥ δ∗
n for some δ∗
n. The optimal cut-oﬀ point in the best equilibrium for the ﬁrm, ˜ kn,i st h e
smaller solution to the fundamental equation (12). The merged ﬁrm’s value per market is
πn =
(1 − δ)r
1 − δ[1 − Φ(˜ kn)]
It is increasing in r, δ and 4, and decreasing in d and ¯ σn.
From Proposition 5, the construction of the best equilibrium under integration parallels
nicely with that under non-integration. We exploit this in the next section to investigate the
optimal degree of horizontal integration and to conduct comparative statics.
The Case of Independent Technologies
Even though we think common technology seems to ﬁt reality better, we now brieﬂyc o n s i d e r
the case in which the integrated ﬁrm adopts independent technologies for all its branches. The
case of independent technologies diﬀers from that of common technology in that the noise in
the average signal ¯ ²n =
Pn
1(ηj + θj)/n ∼ N(0, ¯ σ2
n),w h e r e¯ σ2
n =( σ2
η + σ2
θ)/n.P r o p o s i t i o n 3
is clearly still valid, so we can focus on the equilibrium in which consumers use the average
signal to monitor the integrated ﬁrm. By Proposition 4, for independent technologies, as long as
0.5n42/σ2
η ≤ ln(1 + τ) (i.e., n is not too large), then only the 1-market deviation constraint is
binding in the best equilibrium for the ﬁrm. It then follows that the normalized signal threshold in






θ/n.W i t ht h i sm o d i ﬁcation, Proposition 5 is still valid. It will become clear that
all of our analysis and basic results in the next section carry through to the case of independent
technologies.
20Suppose instead n is suﬃciently large so that the condition in Proposition 4 does not hold
and the one-market deviation constraint is not the binding constraint. Then it can be shown that
the n-market deviation constraint will be binding. Then the normalized signal threshold in the













The above equation diﬀers from the fundamental equation (4) for the independent ﬁrm only
in that here the signal noise ¯ σn is scaled down by
√
n. By Proposition 2, the proﬁt per market
for an integrated ﬁrm with independent technologies for its branches will be higher than that of
an independent ﬁrm. Indeed the complete monopoly is the optimal conﬁguration in this situation
and the ﬁrst best is achieved as n →∞ .
This result is parallel to Matsushima (2001)’s result for multimarket contact, which shows
that the ﬁrst best is approximately achieved by two big ﬁrms when the number of the independent
markets in which they compete becomes larger. The reason is that the size eﬀect (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990; Andersson, 2002) and the strong information aggregation eﬀect in the case of
independent signals together dominate the deviation eﬀect, making integration always better than
non-integration. Since we assume explicitly that one source of noise comes from the ﬁrm’s tech-
nology, complete independence of noise would be an extreme assumption to make here. Managing
all branches with independent technologies could be prohibitively costly. Furthermore, we do not
obtain the interesting result on the bound of ﬁrm size when all noises are completely independent.
For this reason, we focus on the case where there is some common component (see footnote 21)
in technology shock across the markets.
5 Optimal Degree of Horizontal Integration
In the two preceding sections we derived the best equilibria under non-integration and integration
of n markets (with common technology). By Proposition 5, it is clear that the comparison of non-
integration and integration depends on the probability of reputation termination in equilibrium
under non-integration, Φ(˜ k), and under integration, Φ(˜ kn). Hence, for any given n>1,n o n -
integration dominates integration (π ≥ πn) if and only if ˜ k ≤ ˜ kn.
Since Equation (4) is a special case of Equation (11), a more general question is: what is
the optimal degree of horizontal integration? Or, in other words, what is the optimal size of the
21ﬁrm? Conceptually, the answer is straightforward. For all n =1 ,2,..., let n∗ be such that ˜ kn is
smallest. Then the optimal size of the ﬁrm is simply n∗.I fn∗ =1 , then non-integration is optimal.
If n∗ > 1,t h e naﬁrm serving n∗ markets can best maintain reputation.
Proposition 6 For any δ, ˜ kn is bounded from below and n∗ is ﬁnite.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 says that the maximum proﬁt level, r, possible under perfect monitoring,
cannot be approximated even if the size of the ﬁrm is allowed to go to inﬁnity. It also says that
there exists an optimal size of the ﬁrm. This is in sharp contrast with Bernheim and Whinston
(1990), Matsushima (2001), Andersson (2002), Fishman and Rob (2002), and other papers in the
existing literature on reputation, all of which imply that the bigger, the better. Our result diﬀers
from these papers because we introduce a common production noise, η, which does not vanish
with information aggregation when n →∞ .27 The optimal size of the ﬁrm can be bounded in
our model because, as the ﬁrm size increases, the positive size and information eﬀects become less
and less important, but the negative deviation eﬀect becomes more and more signiﬁcant since it
is more demanding to “detect” one-market deviations for larger ﬁrms.
In fact, we can prove a stronger result.
Proposition 7 Non-integration is optimal when (i) σθ is suﬃciently small; or (ii) δ is suﬃciently
close to one; or (iii) τ is suﬃciently small.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 gives several suﬃcient conditions under which non-integration is optimal (n∗ =
1). In the ﬁrst case when the idiosyncratic taste noise is not important, the information aggregation
beneﬁt from integration is gone, so non-integration is optimal. In the last two cases, reputation
can be maintained quite eﬀectively for ﬁrms of all sizes in the sense that the cut-oﬀ point can be
set at a low level. In such cases, the marginal beneﬁto ft h es i z ee ﬀect from having more severe
punishments is less important. In addition, it is much more diﬃcult to detect small deviations in
larger ﬁrms in the lower tail of the distribution. As a result, integration brings less beneﬁts but
more costs, thus it is dominated by non-integration.
27As long as there exists some common noise component, we can allow idiosyncratic components in the production
noise as well.
22Proposition 8 The optimal degree of integration n∗ is non-increasing in δ.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 shows that as the discount factor increases, the optimal size of the ﬁrm will
decrease (at least weakly) and non-integration is more likely to dominate integration. The intuition
behind this result is roughly as follows. As δ increases, the future payoﬀs are more important and
hence punishments for deviations are larger. This implies that ﬁrms of all sizes can maintain
reputation more eﬀectively. That is, the equilibrium cut-oﬀ points to continue cooperative actions
can be set at low levels. Relatively speaking, the positive size eﬀect of integration is less important
in the sense that the marginal beneﬁts of increasing punishments for deviation through integration
become smaller. On the other hand, since the equilibrium cut-oﬀ points are low, the negative
deviation eﬀect of integration becomes more important because low cut-oﬀ points make it more
diﬃcult to detect a small deviation of a large ﬁrm. These forces together imply that as δ increases,
the optimal size of the ﬁrm will not be larger.
Proposition 9 The optimal degree of integration n∗ is non-decreasing in τ.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 9 shows that as τ decreases, the optimal size of the ﬁrm will decrease (at least
weakly) and non-integration is more likely to dominate integration. Since τ = d/r,i tm e a n s
that a smaller deviation gain, d,o rag r e a t e rh o n e s t yp a y o ﬀ, r, will favor smaller ﬁrms and non-
integration. The intuition behind this result is similar to that of Proposition 8. A smaller τ means
less incentive to deviate and thus smaller or independent ﬁrms can build reputation more eﬀectively.
Consequently, the marginal beneﬁts of the size eﬀect of integration become less important, while
the negative deviation eﬀect of integration is more severe. Therefore, the smaller is τ,t h es m a l l e r
is the optimal size of the ﬁrm.
Next we consider how the informativeness of the signal aﬀects the optimal degree of inte-
gration. We say that the public signal is uniformly more informative if 4 is larger (keeping other
parameters constant) or if both σθ and ση are smaller while their ratio is ﬁxed.
Proposition 10 Suppose δ is suﬃciently close to one. The optimal degree of integration, n∗,i s
non-increasing when the public signal becomes uniformly more informative.
23Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows that for large δ, as the public signal becomes more informative about
the ﬁrm’s eﬀort/quality choices, the optimal size of the ﬁrm will decrease (at least weakly) and
non-integration is more likely to dominate integration. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. When δ is large, the optimal cut-oﬀ point can be set quite low. When the public signal
becomes more informative, small ﬁrms beneﬁt more than larger ﬁrms because a small deviation
by a larger ﬁrm can be “detected" only slightly better with more informative signals. Thus, while
more informative signals make ﬁrms of all sizes better, the negative deviation eﬀect of integration
makes smaller ﬁrms beneﬁt more. Therefore, the more informative the public signal, the smaller
the optimal size of the ﬁrm.
We derive the results of this section under the linear normal information structure. However,
from the proofs and the intuition given above, it is not diﬃcult to see that the insights extend more
generally. With a general information structure, under reasonable conditions, for smaller y,t h en∗
that maximizes the function Gn,1(y) will be smaller. That is, it is more diﬃcult to “detect” a one
market deviation by a larger ﬁrm if the cut-oﬀ point is in the lower tail of the signal distribution.
In such cases, results similar to those obtained here should hold under more general information
structure.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we build a simple model of ﬁrm reputation in which customers can only imperfectly
monitor ﬁrms’ eﬀort/quality choices, and then use the model to study the eﬀects of horizontal
integration on ﬁrm reputation. Our analysis leads to a reputation theory of the optimal size of
the ﬁrm. Our comparative statics results can be helpful for understanding patterns of horizontal
integration in the real world.
T h i sp a p e rh a sf o c u s e do nt h em o r a lh a z a r da s p e c t so fﬁrm reputation. As is common
in this type of model, the ﬁrm maintains good reputation on the equilibrium path until a bad
realization of the public signal, from which point on the ﬁrm enters the punishment phase in
which either customers desert the ﬁrm or the ﬁrm pays large ﬁnancial penalties. This kind of
equilibrium behavior has some unattractive features. First, ﬁrm reputation is relatively constant
and has no real dynamics. Second, the reversion from good reputation to punishment phases,
24which is necessary to provide incentives to maintain reputation, depends heavily on coordination
of beliefs between the ﬁrm and its customers. In equilibrium, punishments are triggered purely by
bad luck, not by bad behavior on the ﬁrm’s part. In addition, when punishments take the form of
a permanent end to the relationship, they are not renegotiation-proof.
To deal with some of the above shortcomings, we demonstrate in the Appendix B that
there exists an eﬃcient renegotiation-proof equilibrium instead of Nash reversion. However, these
issues may be addressed more suitably by introducing adverse selection into the model. Recent
contributions by Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Tadelis (2002) have made important progress
in that direction. Introducing adverse selection into our model may not only generate richer
reputation dynamics and serve to relax belief coordination requirements, but also may address
interesting questions such as: does larger ﬁrm size help good-type ﬁrms build reputation? Can
good-type ﬁrms use size to separate themselves from bad types? These questions are left as topics
for future research.
In this paper we consider only separate markets and assume away possible linkages across
markets, e.g., competition or economies of scales. Those linkages create well understood incentives
or disincentives for integration, which we deliberately ignore to focus on how reputation is related
to integration. However, reputation and competition may interact and lead to other interesting
eﬀects. For example, having a competitor in the market may allow consumers to carry out credible
punishment of dishonest behavior by one ﬁrm, thus helping the ﬁrm build reputation (see, e.g.,
Hörner, 2002). This would generate a disincentive for the two ﬁrms to merge (although merge
eliminates price competition and raises joint proﬁt in a static setting). Extending the model in
this paper to competitive markets is an interesting topic for future research.
25Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: First suppose that (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) is played in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nt h eb e s t
equilibrium. Then it is optimal to play the same equilibrium from the second period on, because the
continuation game is isomorphic to the original game. This implies that one possible best equilibrium is to
play (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) every period independent of history (with price being set high enough), yielding
equilibrium payoﬀso f(0,0). Note that the repetition of (Don0tB u y ,L o w ) is the only equilibrium outcome
which achieves such equilibrium payoﬀs.
Suppose that the best equilibrium achieves more than (0,0). Neither (Buy, Low) nor (Don0tB u y ,H i g h )
can be the ﬁrst period outcome of the equilibrium which maximizes the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ. Therefore (Buy, High)
with p ≤ vh should be the outcome of the ﬁrst period of such equilibrium.
Now we show that such a best equilibrium for the ﬁrm must be a cut-oﬀ trigger strategy equilibrium
with p = vh.28 Let V ∗ > 0 be the best equilibrium payoﬀ for the ﬁrm, p∗ (≤ vh) be the equilibrium ﬁrst
period price, and u∗ be the mapping which maps each public signal y to the equilibrium continuation payoﬀ
u∗ (y) ∈ [0,V∗]. Let U be the set of all measurable functions u : < → [0,V∗]. Then the following holds:
V ∗ ≤ max
u∈U
(1 − δ)(p∗ − ch)+δE [u(y)|eh]
s.t. (1 − δ)(p∗ − ch)+δE [u(y)|eh] ≥ (1 − δ)(p∗ − cl)+δE [u(y)|el]
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that the true set of continuation equilibrium payoﬀsm a yn o t
be able to take all the values between 0 and V ∗.
However, it is not diﬃcult to show that the (essentially unique) solution ˜ u ∈ U for this optimization
problem satisﬁes ˜ u(y)=0for y ∈ (−∞, e y) and ˜ u(y)=V ∗ for y ∈ [e y,∞) for some e y by the MLRP.29 Then
since both V ∗ and 0 are equilibrium payoﬀs, the maximized value of this optimization problem can indeed
be achieved as an equilibrium payoﬀ by using the following cut-oﬀ trigger strategy (starting in state 1);
• State 1: Play High with p = p∗ and move to State 2 if and only if y ∈ (−∞, e y).
28The best equilibrium payoﬀ exists because the equilibrium payoﬀ set is compact.
29The following perturbation argument might be useful to understand this. Suppose that u(y0) <u(y00)
for some y00 <y 0. Consider a perturbation u(y0)+ε0 and u(y00) − ε00 for ε0,ε00 > 0 such that f (y0|eh)ε0 −
f (y00|eh)ε00 =0 . Then the expected continuation payoﬀ given eh is the same as before, but the expected
payoﬀ given el is strictly lower because f (y0|el)ε0 − f (y00|el)ε00 < 0 if f satisﬁes MLRP.
26• State 2: Play Low with p>v l and stay at state 2.
Since ˜ u ∈ U is (essentially) the unique solution to the above optimization problem, the equilibrium
continuation payoﬀ function u∗ to achieve V ∗ must be ˜ u (almost everywhere). Finally, there is no restriction
on p∗ as long as p∗ ≤ vh. Thus the optimal price should be p∗ = vh in every period at State 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is easy to check that limk→−∞ G(k)=0and limk→∞ G(k)=−1.F u r t h e r -
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τ
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Since the normal distribution satisﬁes the strict monotone likelihood ration property (Milgrom, 1981; Riley,
1988), it must be that G0(k) > 0 for k ∈ (−∞,k∗) and G0(k) < 0 for k ∈ (k∗,∞). Hence k∗ maximizes
G(k) and G(k∗) > 0.T h u s ,G(k) is unimodal (pseudoconcave).
Since (1−δ)/δ is strictly decreasing in δ and goes to zero as δ goes to one, Equation (4) has a solution
for all δ ≥ δ
∗,w h e r eδ
∗ satisﬁes G(k∗)=( 1−δ)/δ. For all δ > δ
∗, there are two solutions for Equation (4).
By Proposition 1, the cut-oﬀ point in the best equilibrium corresponds to the smaller solution for Equation
(4), and its equilibrium payoﬀ is given by Equation (5). For δ > δ
∗, all the comparative statics results are
veriﬁed immediately from Figure 1. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 1 once we reduce the
dimensionality of signals. Now the ﬁrm can deviate from eh to el in any subset of the n markets. But the
trick to concentrate punishments in the lower tail of the distribution (cf. Footnote 29) still works because
MLRP holds with respect to every such deviation in the same direction. Other than this, the proof is
completely identical. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : For any n,l e tk =
y−eh





























Lemma 4 Suppose ln(1 + τ) ≥ 0.542/σ2
η. Then for any n and for any m ≤ n, k∗
nm +
m4
n¯ σn ≤ 0.














Under the assumption that ln(1 + τ) ≥ 0.542/σ2









ln(1 + τ) < 0
















































So, μ(x) > 0 and hence κ0
nm(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0,1]. It follows that κnm(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0,1].
Q.E.D.
28Since ˜ knm ≤ k∗
nm, Lemma 4 implies that for any n and for any m ≤ n, ˜ knm +
m4



































where ¯ k ∈ (k,k+
m4
n¯ σn).S i n c ef o ra n yn and for any m ≤ n, ˜ knm+
m4









in the relevant range, and thus Gnm(k) is increasing in m. Therefore, only the 1-shot deviation constraint
is binding in the best equilibria for any n. Q.E.D.









































When n goes to inﬁnity, we have
lim







































The solution ˜ k for this equation (if it exists) is clearly ﬁnite. Hence, limn→∞ ˜ kn > −∞.
29Next note that Gn (k)=
4
¯ σn φ(e k)






. Remember that relevant k is
negative by Lemma 4. For any negative k, there exists n0 such that Gn0 (k) > limn→∞ Gn (k) . This implies
that n0 dominates all large n, which implies that the size of optimal integration is bounded. Q.E.D.




















































































σ ). We show that for all x (hence, for all n and all σθ), ∃ξ < 0 such that
ρ(k,x)=
Φ(k + x) − Φ(k) − φ(k + x)x
φ(k + x)x2 < ξ < 0
Note ﬁrst that ρ(k,x) < 0 for all x>0, because the numerator equals (φ(~ k)−φ(k +x))x<0,w h e r e
~ k ∈ (k,k + x) (assuming that all the cut-oﬀ points are small enough). As x → 0,i tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that
ρ(k,x) → k/2 < 0. Furthermore, one can show that ∂ρ/∂x has the same sign as
−2[Φ(k + x) − Φ(k) − φ(k + x)x]+x(k + x)[Φ(k + x) − Φ(k)]
This function takes a value of zero when x =0and has a derivative of (k+x)[Φ(k + x)−Φ(k)−φ(k + x)x]+
x[Φ(k + x) − Φ(k)] > 0.T h u s ,ρ(k,x) is increasing in x.L e tξ = ρ(
4
σ ) < 0.T h e nρ is uniformly bounded
above by some ξ < 0 (for any small enough k). Therefore, for each ﬁxed k,
∂Gn(k)
∂n < 0 as σθ → 0 for all n.
Let k∗
n be the solution of fundamental equation for Gn(k)=1−δ





n for n =2 ,3..... It follows that non-integration is optimal.







Φ(k + x) − Φ(k)














Hence, for any n and for a suﬃciently small kn,s i n c ex =
4





θ = −n ¯ σn
2 +0 .5σ2
θ < 0
Furthermore, it can be veriﬁed that ∂ρ/∂k has the same sign as
(k + x)[Φ(k + x) − Φ(k)] + φ(k + x) − φ(k)
This function goes to zero as k →− ∞ , and has a derivative of Φ(k + x)−Φ(k)−xφ(k) > 0.T h u s ,ρ(k,x)
is increasing in k.
Take k1. We know that the RHS of Equation (14) is negative at x =
4
¯ σ as long as k ≤ k1.S i n c eρ is
increasing in x, the RHS of Equation (14) must be negative for all x<
4
¯ σ when k = k1.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eρ
is increasing in k,t h i sm u s tb et r u ef o ra l lx as long as k ≤ k1.
Therefore, for suﬃciently small k,i tm u s tb et h a tGn is decreasing in n so that G1(k) >G n(k) for
all n>1.S i n c e˜ kn goes to −∞ for all n when either δ is suﬃciently close to one or τ is suﬃciently small,
Non-integration is optimal (n∗ =1 ) as before in either of the cases. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :W eﬁrst prove a useful lemma. Deﬁne G0(k;t,x)=
Φ(k+x)−Φ(k)
t − Φ(k).
Lemma 5 Let 0 <t 0 <tand 0 <x 0 <x .T h e r ee x i s t saˆ k such that G0(k;t0,x 0) ≤ G0(k;t,x) if and only
if k ≤ ˆ k.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :D e ﬁne w(k;t,x,t0,x 0)=G0(k;t,x) − G0(k;t0,x 0).N o t e t h a t a s k →− ∞ ,b o t h
G0(k;t,x) and G(k;t0,x 0) go to zero; and as k →∞ ,b o t hG(k;t,x) and G(k;t0,x 0) go to −1.T h u s ,w(k)
goes to zero as k →− ∞and as k →∞ .
31Diﬀerentiating w gives
w0(k)=
φ(k + x) − φ(k)(1 + t)
t
−














Let us call the expression in the bracket above η(k).S i n c e x>x 0, η(k) →∞as k →− ∞ .W h e n
k →∞ , η(k) → t/t0 − 1 > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,w eh a v e
η0(k)=−xe− x2














ln(xt0) − ln(x0t) − 0.5x2 +0 .5(x0)2
x − x0
It is clear that η0(k) < 0 for k<¯ k and η0(k) > 0 for k>¯ k.S oη(k) reaches its minimum at ¯ k.I f
η(¯ k) ≥ 0,t h e nη(k) > 0 for all k 6= ¯ k.T h i si m p l i e st h a tw0(k)=φ(k)η(k)/t, w0(k) > 0 for all k 6= ¯ k and
w0(k)=0at k = ¯ k.T h u s w(k) is always strictly increasing except at ¯ k as a reﬂection point. But this
contradicts the fact that w(k) goes to zero as k →− ∞and as k →∞ . Therefore, it must be that η(¯ k) < 0.
Since η(−∞)=∞ and η(∞)=t/t0 − 1 > 0,t h e r ee x i s tk1 and k2, k1 < ¯ k<k 2, such that η(k)=0 .
So η(k) > 0 for k ∈ (−∞,k 1) ∪ (k2,∞) and η(k) < 0 for k ∈ (k1,k 2). Since the sign of w0(k) is identical
to that of η(k), w(k) is strictly increasing for k ∈ (−∞,k 1) ∪ (k2,∞) and strictly decreasing k ∈ (k1,k 2).
Therefore, there must exist a unique ˆ k ∈ (k1,k 2) such that w(k)=0 .M o r e o v e r ,w(k) > 0 for k<ˆ k and
w(k) < 0 for k>ˆ k. Q.E.D.
Consider any n<n 0.L e tt = τ/n, x = 4/(n¯ σn),a n dt0 = τ/n0, x0 = 4/(n0¯ σn0). Then, t>t 0 and
x>x 0.S i n c e Gn(k)=G0(k;t,x) and Gn0(k)=G0(k;t0,x 0), by Lemma 5, there exists a ˆ knn0 such that
Gn(k) >G n0(k) if and only if k<ˆ knn0.
Now suppose for some δ, the optimal degree of integration is n∗(δ). This means that at ˜ kn∗(δ),
Gn∗(δ) ≥ Gn0 for all n0. Therefore, for n0 >n ∗(δ),i tm u s tb et h a t˜ kn∗(δ) < ˆ kn∗(δ)n0;a n df o rn0 <n ∗(δ),i t
must be that ˜ kn∗(δ) > ˆ kn∗(δ)n0.
32Consider an increase in δ to δ1 > δ. For any n, ˜ kn decreases in δ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,˜ kn∗(δ)(δ1) is smaller
than ˜ kn∗(δ)(δ).N o t et h a tδ does not eﬀect ˆ knn0 at all. Hence, for n0 >n ∗(δ),w eh a v e˜ kn∗(δ)(δ1) < ˆ kn∗(δ)n0,
so Gn∗(δ) ≥ Gn0 at ˜ kn∗(δ)(δ1). Therefore, the optimal degree of integration at δ1, n∗(δ1), cannot be greater
than n∗(δ). For all n0 <n ∗(δ),i f˜ kn∗(δ1) > ˆ kn∗(δ)n0, then we must have n∗(δ1)=n∗(δ).O t h e r w i s e , i f
˜ kn∗(δ1) < ˆ kn∗(δ)n0 for some n0 <n ∗(δ),t h e nGn∗(δ) <G n0 at ˜ kn∗(δ1), which implies that n∗(δ1) must be
smaller than n∗(δ). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 : The proof is similar to that of Proposition 8. Suppose for some τ,t h eo p t i m a l
degree of integration is n∗(τ). Consider a decrease in τ to τ1 < τ.S i n c eGn is decreasing in τ,t h e n˜ kn is
increasing in τ. Hence, ˜ kn∗(τ)(τ1) is smaller than ˜ kn∗(τ)(τ). From the proof of Lemma 5, for any n and n0,
ˆ knn0 depends on the ratio of t/t0 but not on t nor t0.S i n c et/t0 = n/n0 is independent of τ, for any n and n0,
ˆ knn0 is independent of τ. That is, the relative positions of Gn are independent of τ. Therefore, a decrease
in τ is like an increase in δ. The same argument in the proof of Proposition 8 applies. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 : We only need to consider an increase in 4. The argument is identical for a
decrease in σθ and ση of the same proportions. Suppose for some 4, the optimal degree of integration is
n∗(4). Consider an increase in 4 to 41 > 4.S i n c eGn is increasing in 4, ˜ kn is decreasing in 4. Hence,
˜ kn∗(4)(41) is smaller than ˜ kn∗(4)(4). From the proofs of Propositions 8 and 9, it suﬃces to show that for
any n and n0 >n , ˆ knn0 is nondecreasing in 4.






















Exactly as in Lemma 5 and Propositions 8, w crosses zero only once at ˆ knn0 as it is decreasing. So to






























































33It is easy to see that ∂R












σ , then the proposition holds.










σ .S i n c e
ˆ knn0 is independent of δ,t h e nf o rl a r g eδ, ˆ knn0 is greater than ˜ kn∗(4)(41) and ˜ kn∗(4)(4),s ot h ec l a i mo f
the proposition is true. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium
In this Appendix, we show that the same outcome derived in Section 2 can be implemented in a
renegotiation-proof equilibrium. Consider the following strategy. If the public signal falls below the cut-oﬀ
point ˜ k, in the next period the ﬁrm oﬀers customers a (very low) price p0 and continues to provide high
eﬀort, and customers continue to buy from the ﬁrm. If the public signal in the punishment period is above
another cut-oﬀ point k0,t h e nt h eﬁrm is “redeemed,” and can switch back to the reputation phase, charging
p = vh in the next period. Otherwise, the ﬁrm stays in the punishment phase oﬀering the low price p0.30
Since the ﬁrm provides high eﬀort in every period in both reputation and punishment phases, any such
reputation equilibrium is eﬃcient.
For this punishment scheme together with the reputation phase described above to constitute an
equilibrium, we need to have
(1 − δ)(p0 − ch)+δ(1 − Φ(k0))π =0 (15)
where π is the ﬁrm’s average value as characterized in Proposition 1. The ﬁrst term, (1−δ)(p0 −ch),i st h e
ﬁrm’s (negative) proﬁt per period in the punishment phase averaged over periods; while the second term is
the discounted expected future proﬁt if it redeems itself, which occurs with probability 1−Φ(k0). Therefore
this condition states that p0 and k0 should be chosen so that the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is zero once it is in
the punishment phase.
In addition, the ﬁr mm u s tb ew i l l i n gt op r o v i d eh i g he ﬀort in the punishment phase, which requires
the following incentive constraint:
(1 − δ)(p0 − ch)+δ(1 − Φ(k0))π ≥ (1 − δ)(p0 − cl)+δ
µ






30This is similar to a “stick and carrot” equilibrium (Abreu, 1988).
34Or, recalling that d = ch − cl,w eh a v e








This simply says that the gain from a one period deviation to low eﬀort during the punishment phase is
less than the loss of future proﬁtf r o ml o we ﬀort which serves to reduce the probability of switching back
t ot h eh i g hp r i c ea n dh i g hp r o ﬁt of the reputation phase.
Note that the IC constraint of equation (16) is identical to that of the reputation phase, Equation
(2) or (3). Thus, (16) is satisﬁed if and only if the cut-oﬀ point k0 is not less than the smaller solution and
not greater than the larger solution to the fundamental equation (4). For any such k0, if there exists a price
p0 satisfying equation (15), then we have an eﬃcient renegotiation-proof equilibrium
Two remarks are in order here. First, there may be multiple (k0,p 0) that satisfy the above two
conditions (15) and (16). Clearly, the larger k0 is, the higher p0 is. Second, to satisfy equation (15) may
require a negative price p0, which may not be feasible in many contexts. By Equation (15), p0 can be







,w h e r eb k is the cut-oﬀ point in the reputation phase, due to the symmetry of normal
distribution. Thus, there exists (k0,p 0 (≥ 0)) that satisfy (15) and (16) if and only if
−(1 − δ)ch + δΦ(b k +
4
σ
)π ≤ 0 (17)
This inequality is satisﬁed when δ is large enough. To summarize, we have the following result.
Proposition 11 There exist k0 ∈ < and p0 ∈ <+ that satisfy (15) and (16) if and only if (17) is satisﬁed.
Moreover, (17) is satisﬁed when δ is suﬃciently large.31

























31It can also be shown that if this “stick and carrot” strategy cannot implement the minmax payoﬀ 0f o r





















Since b k →− ∞ , thus φ(b k +
4















= d = ch − cl <c h
Q.E.D.
This renegotiation-proof best reputation equilibrium exhibits a particular kind of price dynamic. The
price dynamics of a best reputation equilibrium characterized in this section is shown in Figure 2 below.
An example of such price dynamics is an airline company who just had a bad incident (e.g., a plane crash).
Even if the incident can be purely bad luck, the company typically oﬀers large discounts to “win back”
customers; and such discounts are phased out over time as customers “regain” conﬁdence in the company.
This is similar to the price dynamics of Green and Porter (1984), the ﬁrst to construct public strategy
equilibria with punishment phases in a model of imperfect monitoring. In their equilibrium construction of
a repeated duopoly model with stochastic demand, ﬁrms continue to collude until the price drops below a
threshold level, then they play the Nash Cournot equilibrium for a ﬁxed number of periods before reverting
back to the collusive phase. Our construction of the best equilibrium with eﬃcient punishment phases
diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r sb e c a u s et h eﬁrm and customers in our model can use prices to transfer utilities, achieving







[1] Abreu, Dilip, Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce, 1991, Information and timing in repeated
partnerships, Econometrica, 59:1713-1733.
[2] Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, 1986, Optimal Cartel Equilibria with
Imperfect Monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, 39:251-269.
[3] Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, 1990, Towards a Theory of Discounted
Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, Econometrica, 58:1041-1063.
[4] Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz, 1972, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, American Economic Review, 62:777-795.
[5] Andersson, Fredrik, 2002, Pooling Reputations, International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion, 20:715-730.
[6] Bernheim, Douglas and Michael Whinston, 1990, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behav-
ior, RAND Journal of Economics , 21:1-26.
37[7] Cabral, Luis, 2000, Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation, RAND Journal of Economics,
31:658-673.
[8] Cabral, Luis, 2007, Optimal Brand Umbrella Size, Working Paper, New York University.
[9] Cai, Hongbin and Ichiro Obara, 2004, Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration, mimeo,
UCLA.
[10] Coase, Ronald, 1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4:386-405.
[11] Fishman, Arthur, 2005, Financial Intermediaries as Facilitators of Reputation Acquisition in
Credit Market, Working Paper, Bar Ilan University.
[12] Fishman, Arthur and Rafael Rob, 2002, Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation, Working
Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
[13] Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine and Eric Maskin, 1994, The Folk Theorem with Imperfect
Public Information, Econometrica, 62:997-1039.
[14] Green, Edward and Robert Porter, 1984, Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price
Information, Econometrica, 52: 87-100.
[15] Gutman, Joel and Nira Yekouel, 2002, Economics of Scale in Reputation: A New Theory of
the Emergence of Firms, Working Paper, Bar Ilan University.
[16] Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure,O x f o r dU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s .
[17] Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts, 1998, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, Journal
of Economic Perspective,12:73-94.
[18] Hörner, Johannes, 2002, Reputation and Competition, American Economic Review, 92:644-
663.
[19] Jin, Ginger and Phillip Leslie, 2004, Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene, Working
Paper, Stanford University.
[20] Klein, Benjamin and Keith Leﬄer, 1981, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 89:615-641.
38[21] Kreps, David, 1990, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Perspectives on Positive
Political Economy, eds. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge University Press:
New York.
[22] Mailath, George and Larry Samuelson, 2001, Who Wants a Good Reputation? Review of
Economic Studies, 68:415-441.
[23] Marvel, Howard and Lixin Ye, 2004, Trademark Sales, Entry, and the Value of Reputation,
Working Paper, Ohio State University.
[24] Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001, Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collu-
sion, Journal of Economic Theory, 98:158-178.
[25] Milgrom, Paul, 1981, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,
Bell Journal of Economics, 12:380-391.
[26] Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization, and Management,E n g l e -
wood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
[27] Riley, John, 1988, Ex Post Information in Auctions, Review of Economic Studies, 55:409-430.
[28] Rob, Rafael and Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004, Reputation and Turnover, Working Paper, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
[29] Tadelis, Steven, 1999, What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset, American Eco-
nomic Review, 89:548-563.
[30] Tadelis, Steven, 2002, The Market for Reputation as an Incentive Mechanism, Journal of
Political Economy, 110:854-882.
[31] Williamson, Oliver, 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.
39